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STATE PROPERTY TAXES AND THE FEDERAL
SUPREME COURT
By ROBERT C. BROWN*

With the general provisions of the Federal Constitution
delegating the taxing power to the Federal government, as
supplemented by the Sixteenth Amendment, there is almost
no limit in theory or in fact to the Federal taxing power.
Nevertheless, there is one important form of taxes which is
without its scope. This is the ordinary property tax. The
reason is, of course, that a property tax is a direct tax, and
the Constitution provides that direct taxes imposed by the
Federal government must be apportioned among the states
according to population.1 It needs no argument that this
practically precludes the Federal government from imposing
a property or other direct tax.
The importance of this limitation is being understood more
and more with the present enormous extension of the burden
of Federal taxes; but even yet it is probably not fully realized.
The property tax is the only tax which can be imposed by
the states and their subdivisions which cannot be likewise
imposed by the Federal government. It is thus ultimately
the only form of tax of which the states can be reasonably
sure. The burden of the Federal Income Tax is already
such as to leave little field for state income taxes; and the
same situation seems to be rapidly approaching with Federal
death and many miscellaneous excise taxes.2 If the states
are deprived, or are foolish enough to deprive themselves
of the property tax, they will commit gradual but sure economic suicide; and our dual form of government will soon
be at an end.
Since the property tax is thus a state and local monopoly,
it would seem at first glance that the Federal courts would
*Professor of Law Indiana University School of Law.
I U. S. Constitution, Art I, sec. 2, subd. 3; Art. I, sec. 9, subd. 4.
2 See Fairchild "The Impact of Federal Taxation on State Finances," Proceedings of the 29th Conference of the National Tax Association, 1936, p. 283 ff.
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have nothing to do with it. And such would be the case if
the Federal Constitution did not restrict state action, not only
in relation to the Federal government but also in relation to
private interests. Such restrictions are applicable with reference to property taxes, as with reference to all other state
and local activities; and as such they are enforced by the
Federal Supreme Court.
The chief constitutional provision under which state property tax problems come before the Federal courts is, as might
be expected, the Fourteenth Amendment. Here both the due
process and the equal protection clauses are involved. 3 In
addition, at least two clauses of the original Constitution
have been appealed to in property tax controversies-namely,
the privileges and immunities clause4 and the contracts clause,5
though both of these have had much less scope in this matter
than the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is probably true that the Supreme Court has interfered
less with state property taxes than with some other kinds of
state taxes. 6 Nevertheless, the Court has insisted upon the
compliance with certain requirements, or at least limitations,
both in the imposition and administration of such taxes. It
is the purpose of this paper to review briefly the principal
rules which the Supreme Court has laid down with respect to
the constitutional requirements for property taxes.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROPERTY TAXES AND OTHER

FORMS OF TAXATION

The definition of a property tax and its distinction from
other forms of taxes imposed by the states or their subdivisions is obviously one primarily of state law. 7 Indeed, it
is usually of no consequence in the Federal courts unless it
3 U. S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, sec. 1.
4 U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2, subd. 1.

5U. S. Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, subd. 1.
6 See T. R. Powell, "Supreme Court Condonations and Condemnations of
Discriminatory State Taxation, 1922-1925" (1926) 12 Va. L. R. 441, 546.
7

Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S.10 (1904).
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involves interference with Federal functions. 8 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has occasionally been compelled to settle
this problem where a case was begun in the Federal court
attacking a state tax as a property tax and therefore in violation of some provision of the state constitution-usually
the equality and uniformity clause, which is unfortunately
very common.
Probably the leading case on this point is Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.9 Here the question was as to the validity of a Kentucky tax of 50 cents a gallon imposed on all
whisky withdrawn from bond or transferred out of the state
in bond. It was conceded that the tax was invalid as contravening the equality and uniformity clause of the state constitution if it was a property tax. The state contended that
it was an excise tax, and the Court was thus obliged to decide
as to the real nature of the tax, the Kentucky courts not
having passed upon this question.
The Court held unanimously that this was in fact a property tax and, therefore, unconstitutional. The gist of the
opinion, which was written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, may be
shown in the following quotation:
"The tax might be said to be upon the act of removal from the
bonded warehouse within the state. But, as stated by the lower court,
'the thing really taxed is the act of the owner in taking his property out
of storage into his own possession (absolute or qualified), for the purpose
of making some one of the only uses of which it is capable; i.e., consumption, sale, or keeping for future consumption or sale. . . . The
whole value of the whisky depends upon the owner's right to get it
from the place where the law has compelled him to put it, and to tax
the right is to tax the value.' To levy a tax by reason of ownership
of property is to tax the property. Compare Thompson v. Kreutzer,
112 Miss. 165, 72 So. 891; Thompson v. McLeod, 112 Miss. 383, 73
So. 193. It cannot be made an occupation or license tax by calling
it so."1 0

On the other hand, the court held in Oliver Iron Mining
Co. v. Lord" that a Minnesota tax on the production of iron
8 See Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363 (1930).
9

255

U. S. 288 (1921).

10 255 U. S. 294 (1921).

11262 U. S. 172 (1923).
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ore, measured by the value of the ore less certain expenses,
was an, occupation tax and not a property tax. The Dawson
case was expressly distinguished on the ground that in that
case the tax was upon the only possible use of the product,
while here the ore could be sold in place and thus the tax be
avoided. The distinction thus seems to be that a tax which
is based upon a particular use of property is not a property
tax, except in the unusual situation where the use subject to
tax is in fact the only possible one of the property. In the
latter case it becomes a property tax.
The problem of the nature of a property tax as distinguished from other sorts comes up fairly frequently in connection with corporation taxes. Frequently a state tax upon
the capital stock of the corporation is regarded as in fact a tax
upon the property of the corporation-including its intangible
property. 12 However, this is not always the case; such a tax
may in fact be an excise tax. 13 Furthermore, the intangible
property of a corporation may be taxed separately, 14 though
this is perhaps rather unusual.
Furthermore, it is not unusual for states to impose a tax
upon gross receipts of corporations. This tax, if in lieu of
other property taxes, is itself a property tax. 15 The purpose
is generally to base the tax upon what is regarded as a more
accurate measure of the value of the property-especially the
intangible property-than can be obtained by more usual
methods of assessment. Such a tax may therefore include
gross receipts from interstate commerce without a violation
of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 6
32 Green v. Louisville Ry. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917).
13 Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U. S. 506 (1938).
See also
Southern R. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519 (1923).
14 People ex rel. Brooklyn City R. Co. v. State Board, 199 U. S. 48 (1905),
sustaining the New York "special franchise" tax, as a property tax on utility
franchises.
15 Hopkins v. So. California Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 393 (1928); Alward v.
Johnson, 282 U. S. 509 (1931).

16 McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651 (1898).
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JURISDICTION TO

TAX

PROPERTY

Since an attempt to impose any sort of tax without jurisdiction is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
problem of jurisdiction to tax is a Federal question. However, this matter has been so extensively dealt with in recent
years 7 that a very brief discussion will suffice for this purpose, except where recent decisions of the Supreme Court
have affected the principles previously supposed to have been
settled.
The problem of jurisdiction to tax property depends upon
the actual location of the property, at least if the property
has any 'location in a realistic sense. Real estate certainly
has; and the state where it is situated has jurisdiction, and
indeed the sole jurisdiction, to tax such real estate, or any
interest in it, whether legal or equitable."' The same rule
applies to tangible personal property, at least in so far as it
has a permanent location; and this without regard to the
residence of the owner. :9
As to intangible property, the problem is quite different,
since such intangibles normally have no actual situs. Where
intangible property merely represents tangible property, it
cannot be separately taxed.2 0 But where, as is usually the
case, it has no definite connection with tangible property, and
17 See Merrill, "Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word" (1935) 44 Yale L. J.
582; Brown, "Domicile Versus Situs as the Basis of Tax Jurisdiction" (1936)
12 Ind. L. J. 87. Numerous other articles on various aspects of this general
problem have been published in the last few years.
18 The mortgagee's interest in land may be taxed separately from the
mortgagor's interest; and if this is done, both interests are taxable at the situs
of the land, though the mortgagee is domiciled elsewhere. Savings & L. Soc.
v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898).
See Brown, "The Taxation of
Real Estate Subject to Mortgage and Other Incumbrances" (1936) 20 Minn.
L. R. 347. More usually, however, the full value of the land is taxed to the
mortgagor without separating the mortgagee's interest. Paddell v. New York,
211 U. S. 446 (1908).
Similarly, the interests of beneficiaries of a land trust are taxable only
where the land is situated. Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 (1935).
19 Union. Ref. Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905).
20 Sellinger v. Kentucky, 213 U. S. 100 (1909).
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where it has no actual or business 2 1 situs, the Court has had

great difficulty with the situation. However, by a series of
comparatively recent cases, culminating in First National
Bank v. Maine,22 it was settled-or at least supposed to be
settled-that the property was taxable by the jurisdiction of
the domicil of its owner, and by that jurisdiction alone. As
will presently appear, however, this is not now so dear as it
was thought to be.
But before considering this problem it is desirable to mention one other problem-that of apportionment. This comes
up in two rather different classes of cases. First there is the
problem of valuing a stock-in-trade, which is composed of
units which are never individually within the jurisdiction of
the state but where a sufficient number are continuously in
the state to constitute a stock-in-trade.2 3 The other situation
is where the property in the state has physical or organic
connection with property outside the state. The property
outside the state cannot, of course, be taxed; but the state is
entitled to consider it as adding to the property within the
state.

24

In both cases a proper method of apportionment is necessary in order to avoid the effect of taxing property outside
the state. In a number of cases the Court has sustained the
mileage basis in apportioning the property of railroads and
other similar utilities;25 but the mileage basis has been con26
demned where it brings about a seriously unfair result,

unless this unfairness is corrected by the application of some
other method of apportionment.2 7

Furthermore, only prop-

21 That the Court continues to recognize the business situs of intangibles in
a proper case is conclusively shown by Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S.
193 (1936).
22 284 U. S.312 (1932).
23 See e. g. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891).
24 Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894).
25 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876); Pullman's Palace Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154
U. S. 421 (1894).
26 Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919) ; Southern Ry. Co.
v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76 (1927).
27 Chicago Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); Rowley v. Chicago Ry.
Co., 293 U. S. 102 (1934).
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erty outside the state which is actually used in the business

may properly be considered, since it is only such property
which has any bearing upon the valuation of the property in
28
the state.
As already stated, the apparently settled rule that intangible property having no actual or business situs is to be taxed
at the domicil of the owner, and there alone, has again been
put into doubt by recent decisions of the Court. The first of
these is First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota.29 Here the
plaintiff was a Delaware corporation, but transacted practically all its business in Minnesota and was therefore considered to have a business situs for its securities owned by it
in that state. It was held that Minnesota was entitled to tax
the plaintiff on all securities owned by it, including stock of
banks organized in other states. The Court stated that it
was immaterial that these bank stocks might also have been
taxabfe in the states where the banks were organized, though
the Court explicitly declined to pass upon this question. The
decision was undoubtedly influenced by the Court's feeling
that to exempt this stock from Minnesota taxation would
prevent Minnesota from taxing the stock of national banks
in Minnesota by enforcing a discrimination against them.
Even more troublesome is Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania,30 decided in 1938. The case involved a Pennsylvania tax on the stock of domestic corporations. The Pennsylvania courts had held the tax to be one on the stock itself
and not on the assets of the corporations and chargeable
against the stockholders. The Federal Supreme Court, of
course, accepted this interpretation of the tax. It held, however, that the tax might be applied as against nonresident
owners of the stock, even though the same stock would be
taxable again in their respective domicils.
The last statement of the Court is in accordance with the
holding of First National Bank v. Maine,8 1 discussed above,
which, however, was not cited. It should be noted that that
28 Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 (1904).
29 301 U. S.234 (1937).
80 302 U. S. 506 (1938).
81284 U. S. 312 (1932).
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case and its predecessors were strictly not property tax cases
but rather involved state inheritance taxes. However, it was
supposed that they were applicable to property taxes, since
the Court had laid down the rule that jurisdiction to tax
inheritances of property was dependent upon the jurisdiction
to tax the property itself.3 2

It

is, therefore, uncertain

whether the Court now means to overrule First National
Bank v. Maine and its predecessor cases, or whether it merely
means to hold that the rule of those cases applies only to
inheritance taxes and the like, and not to property taxes. In
any event these recent cases seem to open unfortunate possibilities of multiple taxation, at least as respects property
taxes; and multiple property taxation is far more burdensome than multiple inheritance taxes, since property taxes
occur every year. About all that can now be said is that the
situation with respect to jurisdiction to tax intangible property is extremely uncertain, and even more uncertain than was
previously supposed.
DISCRIMINATORY TAXATION OF PROPERTY

Assuming that the state has jurisdiction to tax the property, there are still restrictions as to how the tax can be
imposed and still comply with the Federal Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. Of these, the most important is with respect to discrimination as between different
kinds of property and its owners, which, unless justified, will
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It may be said, in the first place, that the requirements in
this matter are not very rigid. The Court has tended to give
the states very wide latitude in imposing property and all
other forms of taxes, and to sanction considerable discrimination, unless it is pretty clearly unjustified. 33 More specifically, the states may tax certain sorts of property on a
different basis from other sorts, provided the classification
32 See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
33 Bells Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890).
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is reasonable and not purely arbitrary. 34 In other words, the
Supreme Court has not written into the Federal Constitution
the equality and uniformity provisions which are so common
(and it may be said, so unfortunate) in state constitutions.
As the Court said in Colgate v. Harvey,3 5 sustaining a discrimination as to income tax between dividends from corporations not subject to tax (the dividends then being taxable)
and dividends from corporations themselves taxable (the
dividends then being exempt) :
"The question of equal protection must be decided in respect of the
general classification rather than by the chance incidence of the tax in
particular instances or with respect to particular taxpayers." 3 6
One form of discrimination is, however, definitely prohibited; that is between residents and nonresidents.3 7 The
reason is that the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution definitely prohibits any discrimination of this
sort at all, and not merely unreasonable discriminations. On
the other hand, mere differences of procedure in the imposition or collection of taxes are generally sustained, since they
merely equalize the position of residents and nonresidents by
38
making it possible to collect the tax from the latter.
One other problem has been considerably mooted and is
perhaps not entirely settled. This is whether a personal liability for property taxes can be imposed upon nonresidents
of a state with respect to property situated within the state.
The leading case of Dewey v. Des Moines3 9 has generally
been considered to require a negative answer to this question.
There is considerable language in that case to this effect, the
.34State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876) ; Coulter v. Louisville R.
Co., 196 U. S. 599 (1905) ; Puget Sound Co. v. King County, 264- U. S. 22 (1924).
35 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
36296 U. S. 436 (1935).
37 Travis v.Yale & Towne Co., 252 U. S.60 (1920).
38 Gallup v. Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300 (1902); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U. S. 364 (1902); Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U. S. 10 (1904);
Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 618 (1904-); Ballard v. Hunter, 204
U. S.241 (1907).
39 173 U. S.193 (1899).
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Court taking the position that an attempt to impose personal
liability would be in effect to impose a personal rather than
a property tax, which is generally unjustifiable as to nonresidents. An analysis of the facts of the case shows, however, that it is by no means a clear authority on the point.
It rests largely upon the fact that the nonresident property
owner did not receive proper notice of the proposed assessment. 40 The Court has not since this time definitely expressed itself on the point; but it has permitted a state to
collect a property tax on property owned by a nonresident
41
from other property owned by the same person in the state.
This last must be conceded not to be equivalent to the imposition of personal liability upon the property owner, but it is
certainly a long step toward that practical result.
The next possibility of attack upon discrimination as to
property taxes is that between individuals and corporations.
It is clear that an economic discrimination resulting from the
separate taxation of the corporate assets to the corporation
and the stock of the same corporation to its stockholders, is
perfectly permissible. 42 Here we have from the legal standpoint separate property owned by different persons. But
since there is economically double taxation, the states are
permitted to exempt the stock from taxation if the corporation itself is subjected to property taxation. 48 Furthermore,
the property tax of the corporation may be measured, if the
state chooses, upon the basis of the market value of its
securities, which may be regarded as a fair appraisal of the
44
value of all its property, intangible as well as tangible.
A more difficult problem arises where the corporation is
subjected to a higher rate of taxation on its property than
are the individual owners of the same class of property.
Here the question is whether the property tax may be classified as to the owner rather than as to the class of property.
40 See comment by Traynor in (1935)

24 Cal. L. R. 98, 104-105.
41 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934).
42 Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511 (1885).
43 Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 (1930).
Cf. Colgate V.
Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935). 44 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876).
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The Court in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania4 5 indi-

cated that such a classification was invalid as a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The tax involved (one on gross
receipts) seems strictly to have been an excise rather than a
property tax, since it was not in lieu of property taxes; but
the same rule would seem to apply to property taxes. The
Court held that such a tax could not be imposed upon a corporation when a similar tax was not imposed upon individuals
engaged in the same business, as this was a denial of equal
protection to the corporations.
The soundness of this decision is distinctly questionable.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in dissenting pointed out that the state
could have brought about the same result without any question being raised as to its validity, by imposing the tax as an
additional excise tax upon corporations as such, rather than
upon the doing of business. Furthermore, the Court has
sustained state statutes which in fact impose a higher tax
46
upon corporations than upon individual property owners.
For example, there are several cases where provisions for
the collection of back taxes against lands held by corporations were sustained, although property owners who were
individuals and who were guilty of the same delinquency
were freed from this liability. 47

Furthermore, corporations

may be taxed upon stock of other corporations held by them
when individual stockholders are exempted. 48 This general
problem must be regarded as still somewhat unsettled; but it
seems probable that such discrimination between corporations
49
and individuals will ordinarily be sustained.
Another form of discrimination which has been frequently
questioned is that between the taxation of the property of
railroads and similar utilities, and other property. Probably
most states provide for the assessment of railroad and utility
45 277 U. S. 389 (1928).
46 New York v. Barker, 179 U. S. 279 (1900).
47 Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532 (1920); White River
Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 U. S. 692 (1929).
48 Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U. S. 532 (1920).
49 See (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 443. Cf. (1936) 9 Rocky M. L. Rev. 178.
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property of this kind by a state board. This board assesses
the railroad or utility property as a whole and then apportions it among the counties and other taxing subdivisions;
whereas most other property is assessed locally.
The authorities are numerous that this method of assessment is entirely valid, at least so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned. 50 Nor is it material that railroad property is not reduced in valuation in a time of financial stress
as much as other property, 51 especially if the facts show that
on the whole railroad property is not assessed substantially
higher than others. 52 However, a seriously discriminatory
assessment of railroad property will not be sustained merely
because the assessment of such property was made by a different body than those which assessed other property. 53 In
one case 54 the Court'sustained the validity of a Florida statute
which directed the assessment of railroad property either
omitted or underassessed in the preceding three years, though
no provision was made for the similar assessment of other
property under like conditions. This case seems rather extreme. 55
These last cases lead us to a consideration of the most
serious problem of discrimination-namely, discriminations
as to valuation. As already seen, the states may classify
property and tax it at different rates; but here it is assumed
either that there is no classification or that property in the
same class is involved, and that such property is assessed at
different proportions of its actual value.
The problem would seem basically to be one of discrimination and not of valuation of itself. Obviously it makes
50 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876) ; Kentucky Railroad Tax
Cases, 115 U. S. 321 (1885) ; Michigan Central R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U. S. 245
(1906).
51 Southern R. Co. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519 (1923).
52 Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137 (1923).
53 Cummings v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153 (1880). In Green v.
Louisville Ry Co., 244 U. S. 499, and Chicago Ry. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S.
94 (1924), the same doctrine was recognized, but the Court found that there
was no substantial discrimination in fact.
54 Florida R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471 (1902).
55 Mr. Justice Brown submitted a vigorous and rather convincing dissenting
opinion.
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no difference whether assessed valuations are high or low, so
long as they are reasonably uniform. The Court has recognized this, saying in Greene v. Louisville R. R. Co. :58
"It is equally plain that it makes no difference what basis of valua-

tion-that is, what percentage of full value-may be adopted, provided
it be applied to all alike. The adoption of full value has no different
effect in distributing the burden than would be gained by adopting 75
per cent, or 50 per cent, or even 10 per cent as the basis-so long as
either was applied uniformly. The only difference would be that,
supposing the requirements of the treasury remained constant, the rate
of taxation would have to be increased as the percentage of valuation

was reduced."

57

On the other hand, the Court held recently in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks5" that a substantial overvaluation of
the property of a railroad by state assessors was a denial of
equal protection of the laws, even though no fraud or discrimination was shown. The decision is somewhat startling
in its implications. It may mean that the Court now considers the Federal question a simple problem of overvaluation
rather than discrimination. The dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stone 9 in this case puts this matter clearly when he
says:
"The feature of the decision which is especially a matter of concern
is that for the first time this Court is setting aside a tax as a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that the assessment on
which it is computed is too high, without any showing that the assessment is discriminatory or that petitioner is in any way bearing an undue
share of the tax burden imposed on all property owners in the state." 60
56 244 U. S. 499 (1917).
57 244 U. S. 515-516 (1917). In Arkansas ex rel. Utley v. St. Louis R. Co.,
269 U. S. 172 (1925), the federal district court directed assessment of a tax
against property in a county "at its full value," in order to pay a judgment
against the county. The assessment was made at 50 percent of the value of the
property, as was provided by the applicable state statute as construed by its
highest court. The Supreme Court held that this was sufficient compliance
with the mandate of the district court, which must be assumed to have intended compliance with the state laws.
58 297 U. S. 135 (1936). This was a 6-3 decision, Mr. Justice Butler writing the prevailing opinion.
50 Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred with him.
60 297 U. S. 154 (1936).
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It is believed that the Court does not mean to go as far
as this decision suggests. It has recognized that there is a
considerable tendency to assess the property of railroads and
other large corporations at a higher rate than other property, on the theory that these large taxpayers can stand it.61
Of course, there is no real justification for such discrimination, but until the Great Northern case the Court has always
recognized the necessity of compelling the complaining utility
to prove the alleged discrimination. 62 In the Great Northern
case there was probably something of this sort; but the Court
showed improper and embarrassing zeal in correcting this
supposed wrong without definite proof that the wrong actually
existed.
As a general rule, the Court properly holds that it will
interfere if such discrimination is shown, provided only that
it is very clearly shown and that it appears to be intentional,
even though not necessarily in bad faith. Probably the leading case is Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 63 where
the property of the taxpayer was alleged to have been assessed at its full value, whereas all other property in the
county was assessed at not over 55 percent. The state courts
declined to give any relief, on the ground that if there was
discrimination the proper remedy of the taxpayer was to have
other property assessed at its full value as provided by law.
This decision was reversed by the Federal Supreme Court,
which held that the suggested remedy was not practical, and
that on these facts the taxpayer was discriminated against,
even though its property was not assessed at more than its
full value. The Court, speaking by Mr. Chief Justice Taft,
said:
"Such a result as that reached by the supreme court of Nebraska is
to deny the injured taxpayer any remedy at all, because it is utterly

impossible for him, by any judicial proceeding, to secure an increase in
the assessment of the great mass of underassessed property in the tax-

ing district. This court holds that the right of the taxpayer whose
61 See Pittsburgh Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894).
62 Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137 (1923).
63 260 U. S. 441 (1923).
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property alone is taxed at 100 per cent of its true value is to have his
assessment reduced to the percentage of that value at which others are
taxed, even though this is a departure from the requirement of statute.
The conclusion is based on the principle that where it is impossible to
secure both the standards of the true value, and the uniformity and
is to be preferred as the
equality required by law, the latter requirement
64
just and ultimate purpose of the law."

It may be noted, however, that the Court did not give judgment in favor of the taxpayer but merely reversed the case
to enable the taxpayer to prove its contentions. The Court
directed attention to the necessity of the taxpayer proving
that it was intentionally discriminated against before it would
be entitled to any relief.
The doctrine of this case has been frequently followed, 65
so that it must be regarded as settled law that a serious and
intentional discrimination as to the assessment of property is
a denial of the constitutional rights of the owner of the property thus discriminated against, even though the property is
not in fact assessed at more than its actual value. The discrimination consists in assessing at a higher percentage of
such actual value than that at which other property is assessed. The fact that such discrimination results from -the
action of more than one assessing body cannot, of course,
deprive the property owner of his right to relief. 6
On the other hand, a mere showing of discrimination is
insufficient. It must be serious and intentional, though not
necessarily in moral bad faith. 67 It has even been held that
64260 U. S. 446 (1923).
65 See e.g. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930);
Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U. S. 23 (1931); Iowa-Des Moines Nat.
Bank v. Bennett, 284 U. S. 239 (1931). The same rule applies if the apportionment of railroad property within and without the state is on an unsound and
unfair basis. Southern Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76 (1927). A similar
doctrine is applied to the assessment of customs duties. Robertson v. Frank
Bros., 132 U. S. 17 (1889), the Court saying that the rule as to property taxes
is the same.
66 Cummings v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 153 (1880).
67 New York v. Barker, 179 U. S. 279 (1900) ; Coulter v. Louisville R. Co.,

196 U. S. 599 (1905). Florida R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471 (1902), already discussed, is a rather extreme application of this principle.

506

INDI.NA L4I

JOURNAL

no remedy for intentional discrimination will be given when
it lasted only one year and there was no time to correct the
discrepancy until the next year.6 8 And the Court does not
object to a discrimination as to valuation which is intended
merely to prevent evasion of taxation through the holding of
69
non-taxable securities on the tax day.

Normally such intention for discrimination can only be
shown by the fact of the discrimination itself-if it is fairly
serious, it is at least presumptively intentional. It has been
held improper for a court to examine the members of the
7
assessing body with respect to their mental processes, 0
though it is proper to examine them as to the actual percentages of value which they used as the basis of assessment. 7 1
State statutes occasionally provide for peculiar methods of
computing the value of certain sorts of property-as for
instance on a basis of product or earnings. These seem to
be defendable, so long as they are not clearly arbitrary. In
Southern Utah Mines & Smelters v. Beaver County,7 2 the

Court considered the validity of a Utah statute providing
that all metal mines should be assessed at $5 per acre plus
three times the annual proceeds. The Court sustained the
statute generally, saying that while it was somewhat arbitrary (especially when the mine was nearly exhausted), it
was as good a way as any of determining a fair value for
property of this character. The Court held, however, that
the method could not be applied to "tailings," which were
being processed to remove a small amount of metal contained therein, as here it would be wholly arbitrary. Such
"tailings" were therefore required to be assessed like other
property.
Special assessments are determined by somewhat different
principles, as, theoretically, they cannot exceed the amount
68 Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350 (1918).
69 Shotwell v. Moore, 129 U. S. 590 (1889).
70 Chicago Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585 (1907). The Court pointed out
that the members of such a body are in the position of arbitrators-so not
very far from judges.
71 Bohler v. Calloway, 267 U. S. 479 (1925).
72 262 U. S. 325 (1923).
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of benefit to the property. 73 Nevertheless, they are taxes,
and may be made according to land values, as there is nothing to show that an assessment on that basis will exceed the
value of the improvement; and such assessments are, of
course, not discriminatory.7 4
It follows from what has been said that barring a proper
classification of property, or as respects property within a
single class, there must be reasonable equality of rates. However, even this rule is not wholly inflexible. This is shown
by the leading case of General American Tank Car Corp. v.
Day.75 This case came up from Louisiana, which imposed a
tax of 5Y2 mills on all property in the state. An additional
tax of 25 mills on the property of foreign tank car companies was imposed, which was not exacted from domestic
corporations of the same sort; but the latter were subjected
to local taxation, from which the foreign corporations were
exempt.
The Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Stone, found that no
improper discrimination against the plaintiff, a foreign tank
car company, appeared under this arrangement. It said:
"Where the taxing statute which is in lieu of a local tax assessed
on residents discloses no purpose to discriminate against nonresident taxpayers, and in substance does not do so, it is not invalid merely because
equality in its operation as compared with local taxation has not been
attained with mathematical exactness. In determining whether there is
a denial of equal protection of the laws by such taxation, we must look
to the fairness and reasonableness of its purposes and practical operation,
rather than to minute differences between its application in practice and
the application of the taxing statute or statutes to which it is com76
plementary."

The plaintiff further endeavored to show that the average
of local taxation to which its domestic competitors would be
subjected was only 21 mills, as compared with the 25-mill
Norwod v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 (1898).
Fallbrook Irrigation Co. v. Bradley, 164- U. S. 112 (1896).
75 270 U. S. 367 (1926).
76 270 U. S. 373. See also, Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U. S.
73

74

364. (1902).
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tax which it had to pay. The Court held that this claim of
a 4-mill discrimination was not substantiated, but further
stated that, even if it could be proved, such a trifling discrimination as to rate, which was clearly unintentional, would
77
not be sufficient to invalidate the law.

A state may validly make distinctions between various
classes of property as to the tax day, 78 the rate of penalty,79
or other matters which may somewhat affect the burden of
the tax. It may thus classify personal and real property, and
may make a classification upon any reasonable basis, even
though such classification is not in accordance with the traditional conceptions as to the difference between these two
kinds of property. 0 It seems clear also that a state may, if
it chooses, give a discount for prompt payment of taxes, as
well as imposing a penalty for delinquency. 8 ' The sum and
substance seems to be that the Supreme Court will prevent
the states from outrageous discriminations as to property taxpayers; but that the states are not seriously handicapped by
judicial interference (at least from the Federal courts) in
imposing their property tax burden in the manner which they
deem most equitable and desirable.
Only one other form of alleged discrimination seems to
have been passed upon by the Supreme Court. This is with
reference to the distribution of tax monies.
The problem has arisen in two cases from Massachusetts 2
with regard to the distribution of state income tax. Massachusetts still insists that an income tax is a tax on property,
so that these cases are somewhat in point. In both cases the
state law provided for the distribution of the income tax to
political subdivisions of the state on a basis quite different
from that upon which it was collected.
77 Cf. Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U. S. 44-1 (1923),
supra, note 63.
78 Thomas v. Gay. 169 U. S. 264 (1898).
79 Puget Sound Co. v. King County, 264- U. S. 22 (1924).
80 See the cases cited in notes 78 and 79, supra.
81 Merchants Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461 (1897).
82 Dane v. Jackson, 256 U. S. 589 (1921), Knights v. Jackson, 260 U .S.
12 (1922). Only the first of these cases has an adequate opinion.
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The Court sustained this method of distribution, primarily
upon the ground that it was justified by local conditions-particularly so as to penalize wealthy persons who had congregated in certain localities with the purpose and effect of
reducing the property tax rates in such localities. The distribution of the income tax was intended, at least partly, to
equalize the situation as to communities where the property
tax rates had necessarily been higher. The Court quite properly held that discrimination, if such it may be called, was
entirely justified.
The Court did intimate, however, that the distribution of
the property tax was a matter solely of state law with which
the Federal courts would not interfere. It seems that this
is generally true. It is submitted, however, that an extreme
discrimination between localities in a state, which discrimination was not otherwise justified, as it was in the Massachusetts cases cited, would be unconstitutional. Granted that
the municipalities themselves are not entitled to object, nevertheless the citizens of a municipality thus unjustifiably discriminated against have a grievance, since they are being
taxed for the benefit of persons in favored municipalities.
However, a showing of this sort of discrimination would be
extremely difficult, and it is probably safe to say that it is not
likely to be made. Nevertheless, it is believed that a case
might arise where the Federal courts could and should
interfere.
EXEMPTIONS

One problem, and that of some importance, remains as to
the substantive law of property taxation. This is with respect to exemptions.
Where an exemption is intended actually to remove the
burden of taxation from certain favored persons or institutions, and not merely to bring about substantial equality, 3
83 Cf. Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 (1930), where an
exemption from property taxation on corporate stock was sustained where the
property of the corporation itself was taxable by the state.
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there is certainly a question of discrimination. Nevertheless,
this is a problem of state policy with which the Federal
courts will rarely interfere. The Court has often pointed
out that the states are entitled to encourage activities reasonably believed to be for the public benefit, by tax exemption
and otherwise, except so far as they may be restricted in this
by their own constitutions.a4 After all, it is the same, problem of classification, and the judgment of the state legislature should be respected, unless the discrimination is clearly
unjustifiable.85
But even exemptions may in a rare case be condemned.
This is shown by the recent, but already famous, case of
Colgate v. Harvey.88 Here an attack was made on the constitutionality of the Vermont income tax law. The first
ground of attack was that the law exempted dividends from
corporations which were themselves subject to the income
tax, but subjected dividends from corporations not themselves taxable to income tax in the hands of the stockholders.
The Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Sutherland, sustained
this part of the law on the ground that it actually resulted in
substantial equality.8 7
On the other hand, the law was invalidated so far as it
provided that interest paid on loans made within the state at
5 percent interest or less should be exempted, whereas interest from loans within the state at a higher rate of interest
and on all loans outside the state should be taxable. The
Court held that this was a denial of equal protection of the
laws, or, as an alternative ground, that this was a denial
of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.""
It may perhaps be admitted that this case is not particularly important from our point of view. In the first place it
84 Bells Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232 (1890).

85 See e.g. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922), upholding a tax on anthracite coal, from which bituminous coal was exempted.
86 296 U. S. 404- (1935).
87 Cf. Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19 (1930).
88 U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2, subd. 1.
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involves an income tax rather than a property tax. In the
second place the Court was divided, and there was a vigorous
and rather pursuasive dissenting opinion.8 9 Indeed, the alleged ground of violation of the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States seem to have been shown by the
dissenting opinion to be so weak as hardly worth discussion.
Nevertheless, all the attacks which can be made upon the case
cannot change the fact that the Court has held that an exemption which is clearly without justification is a denial of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
rule is sound, even though it may have been, and probably
was, misapplied in that case; and the rule applies to property
taxes as well as all other sorts of taxes. But it is a rule which
is very rarely applicable.
More serious is the problem of the binding force of exemptions under the contracts clause of the Federal Constitution.
Despite numerous and rather well justified criticisms, the rule
was early established that a state could make a binding -contract for exemption of the property of a certain person from
taxation. 90 The Court has itself recognized that this rule is
of questionable desirability as a matter of public policy;91
that it would probably have been better to have held that a
state cannot contract itself out of the taxing power, just as
it cannot contract itself out of its police power. But the
Court has sought to remedy the difficulty by a strict construction of alleged contracts for tax exemption rather than
by wholly invalidating them. 92
89 Mr. Justice Stone wrote the dissenting opinion, Justices Brandeis and
Cardozo agreeing with him. The dissent was only on the point last discussed.
90 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cr. 164 (1812).
91 The Court itself expressed disagreement with the rule sustaining a
binding contract for tax exemption in Gwin v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648 (1886),
where the same land as was held exempt from taxation in New Jersey v.
Wilson, 7 Cr. 164 (1812), jupra, note 90, was involved. The Court held that
where the land had been taxed by the state for 60 years without objection,
the contractual tax exemption must be considered as waived.
See also the excellent argument against the whole doctrine of contractual
tax exemption in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Washington
University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439 (1869).
92 Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 BI. 510 (1863).
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Thus it is clear that a mere failure to provide for the
taxing of a corporation when it is chartered does not amount
to an agreement not to tax it in the future.9 3 But a definite
promise of tax exemption in the charter of a corporation is
binding upon the state.9 4 However, a tax exemption accorded
by statute to a corporation after it is formed is not a binding
contract (since the corporation gives no consideration for it)
and may be later repealed.9 5 Furthermore, it is obvious that
a contractual tax exemption can be obtained only through a
contract to which the state or one of its properly authorized

subdivisions is a party.98
Where a contractual tax exemption is given, it covers all
property owned by the favored person or corporation even
though such property is leased for revenue purposes. It does
not, however, cover the interests of the lessees or other persons not the beneficiaries of the tax exemption, even though
the exemption of such interests would indirectly benefit the
97
favored lessor by making it possible to exact a larger rent.
On the other hand, it has been held that when a railroad
corporation having a contractual tax exemption on its property leased all its property to another corporation, which was
to operate the property, the property was still exempt from
taxation in the hands of the operating lessee.98 The soundness of this decision is extremely questionable," ° but it may
possibly be justified on the theory that the contract contemplated that the property should be exempt so long as it was
actually used for railroad purposes.
93 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514- (1830).
94 Home of Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430 (1869); Washington University
v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439 (1869); Northwestern University v. People, 99 U. S.
309 (1879).
95 Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 24-2 U. S. 100 (1916).
96 Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60 (1905). Also there cannot be a binding contract for tax exemption between a state and one of its subdivisions.
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 (1923).
97 Jetton v. University of the South, 208 U. S. 489 (1908).
98 Wright v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 674 (1915).
The
opinion was written by Mr. Justice Holmes.
99 See the able dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Hughes.
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ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

Having considered the rather liberal substantive rules
which have been enforced by the Federal Supreme Court
with regard to state property taxes, it remains to consider
the procedural requirements which that Court insists upon.
Here the restrictions are perhaps a bit more stringent,
though not very much so. However, they are designed only
to enforce the according to the property owner of a fair
opportunity to enforce his substantive rights, particularly by
giving him reasonable notice and a fair hearing; and they
generally go no further than this.
It is settled law that mere informalities in assessment procedure do not violate the Federal Constitution unless they
result in depriving property owners of their substantial
rights.1 0 0 The requirements of state constitutions are often
much more rigid; but mere informalities do not raise a Federal question. In particular, an erroneous description of the
property in the assessment list does not result in the unconstitutional deprivation of the property of the owner unless
the misdescription has actually misled him. 101 It has been
held that a misdescription which probably misled a nonresident owner of the property made the assessment roll fatally
defective, and that a tax deed based upon that assessment,
even though itself properly describing the property, was
therefore wholly void.' 0 2 It is not entirely clear, however,
whether this case is based upon principles of constitutional
law, or is merely a decision as to the proper construction of
the state statute.' 0 3 It may be inferred, however, that a misdescription of the property so serious as to mislead the property owner so that he could not identify his property on the
assessment roll would probably invalidate the assessment
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
10o McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37 (1877); Castillo v. McConnico, 168
U. S. 674 (1898).
101 Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U. S. 152 (1909).
102 Stout v. Mastin, 139 U. S. 151 (1891).
103 Mr. Justice Brown dissented, but apparently solely on the ground that
the majority had erroneously construed the state statute.
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On the other hand, it seems settled that the assessment of
real estate in the wrong name is wholly immaterial, so far as
the Federal Constitution is concerned. 10 4 The land owner is
expected to watch the assessment of his own property, and
he has no constitutional right to have his property assessed
under any name at all. Furthermore, the Court has sus10 5
tained even more informal back tax assessments.
But the requirement of reasonable notice to the prdperty
owner of the assessment and of a hearing on questions of
valuation and so forth is rigidly enforced, both as to ordinary
taxes' 0 6 and special assessments. 10
The general requirements as to this are summarized by the Court in the leading
case of Londoner v. Denver'0 8 as follows:
"In the assessment, apportionment, and collection of taxes upon
property within their jurisdiction, the Constitution of the United States
imposes few restrictions upon the states. In the enforcement of such
restrictions as the Constitution does impose, this court has regarded substance, and not form. But where the legislature of a state, instead of
fixing the tax itself, commits to some subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in what amount, and upon whom it shall be levied,
and of making its assessment and apportionment, due process of law
requires that, at some stage of the proceedings, before the tax becomes
irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard,
of which he must have notice, either personal, by publication, or by a
law fixing the time and place of the hearing.

"If it is enough that, under such circumstances, an opportunity is
given to submit in writing all objections to and complaints of the tax

to the board, then there was a hearing afforded in the case at bar. But
we think that something more than that, even in proceedings of taxa-

tion, is required by due process of law. Many requirements essential in
strictly judicial proceedings may be dispensed with in proceedings of this
nature. But even here a hearing, in its very essence, demands that he
104 Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210 (1867).

105 Winona Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526 (1895); Weyerhaueser v.
Minnesota, 176 U. S. 550 (1900); White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279
U. S. 692.
106 Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 (1907).
1o7 Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316 (1891).
108 210 U. S. 373 (1908).
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who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations by
argument, however brief; and, if need be, by proof, however informal."1 09

It will be noted from this language of the Court that the
requirements as to notice and hearing are not formalistic,
and in particular are not required to comply with the requirements of a judicial hearing. In particular, a taxpayer is not
entitled to notice of every step in the assessment process, 110
so long as he has a fair opportunity to present his contentions
before an officer or a body which has the authority to decide
the question."' Thus a Georgia statute which permitted a
taxpayer a hearing before arbitrators, but did not permit the
arbitrators to reduce the assessment unless they could agree
as to the proper figure, was held unconstitutional as applied
to a taxpayer who, by reason of the failure of the arbitrators
to agree as to the proper figure, was remitted to the original
assessment, though they all did agree that it was too high." 2
Under this law the arbitration failed, and the hearing under
such circumstances was obviously completely nugatory.
Another application of the same principle is shown in
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill,"3 involving a Missouri
statute. Here the taxpayer claimed discrimination as to assessment of bank stock, and brought a suit in equity in the
state courts to set aside the assessment. The supreme court
of the state held that the plaintiff was guilty of laches because
it had not applied to the State Tax Commission for a revision of the assessment. At the time the controversy arose,
the existing decisions of the state supreme court were to the
effect that the Commission had no jurisdiction of such a controversy; but these decisions were overruled after the present
suit was brought. And it was now too late for the taxpayer
to appeal to the Commission. The Federal Supreme Court,
109 210 U. S. 385-386.
110 Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30 (1893); Voight v. Detroit, 184 U. S.
515 (1902).
111 See Hibben v. Smith, 191 U. S.310 (1903).
112 Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S.64 (1920).
113 281 U. S. 673 (1930).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, held that the
taxpayer could not reasonably be required to appeal to the
State Tax Commission when the court decisions gave it no
right to do so and therefore that the present denial of a judicial review of the assessment was contrary to the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution. The Court said:
"If the result above stated were attained by an exercise of the state's
legislative power, the transgression of the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment would be obvious. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148. The
violation is none the less clear when that result is accomplished by the
state judiciary in the course of construing an otherwise valid (First Nat.
Bank v. Weld County, 264 U. S. 450) state statute. The federal
guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial, as
well as through its legislative, executive, or administrative, branch of
government."' 11

The obvious point is that the taxpayer had had no real
opportunity for a hearing.
On the other hand, the taxpayer may be required to exhaust his rights to administrative hearing where such rights
are made reasonably explicit in the statutes. This is true
even under the Georgia statute already referred to.""5 A
taxpayer who after proper notice of his assessment failed to
demand an arbitration at all was precluded from subsequently
objecting to the assessment in court. 186 The Supreme Court
said as to this:
"It is not essential to due process of law that the taxpayer be given
notice and hearing before the value of his property is originally assessed,
it being sufficient if he is granted the right to be heard on the assessment
17
before the valuation is finally determined."'

Ordinarily a statute, if sufficiently explicit as to the time
and place when assessment rolls may be examined, is itself
-14 281 U. S. 679-680.
115 Cf. Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S. 64- (1920), supra, note 112.
118 McGregor v. Hogan, 263 U. S. 234 (1923). See also, Farncomb v.
Denver, 252 U. S. 7 (1920).
117 263 U. S. 237.
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sufficient notice to all taxpayers. 1 "

It has even been held

that where the statute requires the taxpayer to file a return
of his personal property and he fails to do so, no notice need
be given of an assessment made by a state officer in default
of such a return;119 but this decision is somewhat weakened
by the fact that the complaining taxpayer did have actual
notice and brought a timely suit for abatement under the state
statute.
It is obvious, of course, that a taxpayer is entitled to hearing only with regard to the valuation of his own property or
other question relating definitely to that property. 120 Thus
no notice or hearing need be given as to a general increase of

valuations. In a case 121 involving this question, the Court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Holmes, said:
"If the result in this case had been reached, as it might have been
by the state's doubling the rate of taxation, no one would suggest that
the 14th Amendment was violated unless every person affected had been
allowed an opportunity to raise his voice against it before the body intrusted by the state Constitution with the power. In considering this
case in this court we must assume that the proper state machinery has
been used, and the question is whether, if the state Constitution had
declared that Denver had been undervalued as compared with the rest
of the state, and had decreed that for the current year the valuation
should be 40 per cent higher, the objection now urged could prevail.
It appears to us that to put the question is to answer it. There must
be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to
go on.'

1 22

And on somewhat the same theory, it is held that no notice
and hearing need be given if the tax is specific and not based
upon property valuation. 122 Furthermore, no notice or hearing is essential for assessment if the tax can be collected only
by court proceedings, as the taxpayer can then set forth any
118 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876); Merchants Nat. Bank v.
Pennsylvania, 167 U. S.461 (1897). Even when a taxpayer is entitled to personal notice, a'verbal notice will be sufficient. Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S.
511 (1885).
119 Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U. S.255 (1903).
120 Fallbrook Irrigation Co. v. Bradley, 164. U. S.112 (1896).
121 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board, 239 U. S. 441 (1915).
122 239 U. S. 445.
128 Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S.701 (1884).
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defenses which he may have in the suit to collect the tax. 24
This rule has been applied even where the statute did not
provide for court proceedings to collect the tax, and where,
in fact, the tax was collected through court proceedings. 125
In this last decision, the Court said that the statute was
unconstitutional on its face, since it apparently provided for
an assessment which could be collected by summary proceedings, without notice to or hearing of the property owner;
but, since in fact the taxpayer had his day in court, the
apparent unconstitutionality of the statute did not injure him.
COLLECTION OF TAXES

As already pointed out, the requirement of notice and
hearing is based upon the well-settled doctrine that the assessment of taxes imposes an absolute liability which can be
enforced by summary proceedings. 12

6

The states may there-

fore provide for such proceedings for the collection of the
property taxes. 1 27 If, however, such summary proceedings
are not availed of, but taxes are collected only by judicial
proceedings, no formalities of assessment, even notice or
hearing, are required. As the Court said in Davidson v. New
Orleans :121
"That whenever by the laws of a State, or by state authority, a tax,
assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property for the
public use, whether it be of the whole State or of some more limited
portion of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts
of justice, with such notice to the person, or such proceeding in regard
124Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 (1884.); Winona Land
Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526 (1895).
125 Security Trust Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323 (1906).
126 Den v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (1856).
127 Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 (1877).
In Kentucky Union Co. v.
Kentucky, 219 U. S. 140 (1911), the Court said (219 U. S. 151) "The state is
left to choose its own methods of taxation and its form and manner of enforcing the payment of the public revenues, subject, so far as the Federal
power is concerned, to the restricting regulations of the Constitution of the
United States."
128 96 U. S. 97 (1878). And see the cases cited in note 124, supra.
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to the property as is appropriate to the nature of the case, the judgment
in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner of his property
without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other objections." 129
But summary proceedings are very much more usual for collecting property taxes.
Extremely summary methods, even discriminatory as respects other non-delinquent taxpayers, have been sustained
for the collection of back taxes. 130 Here lands may be forfeited to occupants who have paid taxes where the period of
occupancy is much shorter than the ordinary period for acquiring title by adverse possession. In probably the leading
case on this aspect of the matter, 1' 1 involving a scheme of
this sort in West Virginia, the Court said:
"For the reasons stated, we hold that the system established by West
Virginia, under which lands liable to taxation are forfeited to the state
by reason of the owner not having them placed, or caused to be placed,
during five consecutive years, on the proper land books for taxation, and
caused himself to be charged with the taxes thereon, and under which,
on petition required to be filed by the representatives of the state in the
proper circuit court, such lands are sold for the benefit of the school
fund, with liberty to the owner, upon due notice of the proceeding, to
intervene by petition and secure a redemption of his lands from the
forfeiture declared by paying the taxes and charges due upon them, is
not inconsistent with the due process of law required by the Constitution
of the United States or the Constitution of the state." 132

It is generally recognized that tax sales are quite unsatisfactory in most jurisdictions; but such unsatisfactoriness is
not the fault of the Federal courts. The Supreme Court has
been most liberal in upholding such sales; it is the state courts
which have been so highly technical. The Supreme Court has
set tax sales aside for actual fraud of the purchaser;133 but
the mere fact that the sale might seem somewhat harsh, or
129 96 U. S. 104-105 (1878).
130 Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511 (1885).
131 King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404 (1898).

v. Kentucky, 219 U. S.140 (1911).
132 171 U. S. 436.

13 Slater v. Maxwell, 6 Wall. 268 (1868).

See also, Kentucky Union Co.
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that the bid was seriously inadequate, has not been regarded
by the Court as a violation of the Federal Constitution.3
And the states have been given full power to regulate redemp13 5
tions from tax sales.
Where a tax lien is foreclosed in court, the Supreme Court
has likewise been most liberal in sustaining the proceedings.
Such a lien may be foreclosed like a mortgage, without giving
personal notice to persons holding other liens. 136 It would
appear that such a scheme for foreclosing tax liens could thus
be made reasonably simple and inexpensive, and that the
states might do well to provide for and use this procedure
much more freely than has been the case in the past. It
amounts to a sale of land for taxes, but with the additional
safeguard of judicial proceedings and without much additional expense. In one sense it may be regarded as somewhat less effective, since a tax deed may, if the state law so
13 7
provides, cut off all previous titles or interests in the land. '
However, this generally requires actual notice to all persons
whose interests are thus cut off; and this may be troublesome
and expensive, especially as respects nonresidents. It is often
provided that a tax sale shall not cut off certain liens; and the
Federal courts,, of course, carry out such a provision. 13 8 Furthermore, a tax sale subject to the right of the owner to
redeem his property, is in effect nothing more than the sale
of a tax lien. But, as already said, practically all of the difficulties which the states have in enforcing the payment of
delinquent taxes in this manner are manufactured by the
state constitutions and the state courts; they are not required
by the Federal Constitution, as construed by the Supreme
Court.
The problem of collecting taxes by suit is also largely one
of state law-with the possible exception of the unsettled
134 Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U. S. 135 (1915). In Ballard v. Hunter, 204
U. S. 241 (1907), a tax sale, not having been attacked within the statutory
period, was held binding, though allegedly the land was sold for taxes applying
only to other lands. See also, Saranac Land Co. v. Roberts, 177 U. S. 318 (1900).
135 Violet Trapping Co. v. Grace, 297 U. S. 119 (1936).
136 Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 623 (1904).
137 Hefner v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747 (1887).
138 Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375 (1904).

STATE PROPERTY TAXES

problem, already referred to, of the personal liability of nonresidents for taxes. Probably most state courts take the position that there is no personal liability even of residents for
taxes;-that the summary proceedings provided by statute are
exclusive, and no suit at law can be brought. This rather
absurd doctrine is certainly not accepted by the Supreme
Court as to Federal taxes. The Court, speaking by Mr.
8 9 that
Justice Hughes, held in United States v. Chamberlain'
a Federal excise tax could be collected by suit, even though
there was no express provision in the statute for such an
action. The Court said realistically and sensibly that provisions for penalties were intended to enforce the payment of

the tax rather than to serve as a substitute for it.
The Court does not seem to have passed upon the consti-

tutionality of a state's providing for the prosecuting of suits
against resident owners of property for taxes on such property properly levied and assessed against then.. However,
it would seem rather clear that the Court would not interfere
with such procedure. In the first place, a number of states
do provide for this method of collecting property taxes, and
it would seem that in case of any reasonable doubt of constitutionality, the matter would have been taken to the Court
before this. Secondly, it is hardly conceivable that the Court
would hold this comparatively mild method of collecting taxes
unconstitutional when it sustains much more severe methods,
and has also directly sustained suits to collect Federal taxes.
Thirdly, as will shortly appear, the Court has inferentially
sustained collection of property taxes by suit, when it holds
that such a requirement almost necessarily does away with
equitable interference with the collection of taxes. And
finally, the Court has recently held that a judgment for state
taxes is entitled to full faith and credit in other jurisdic-

tions. 140 On the whole, it is clear that the absurd difficulties
about suing for taxes, under which many states labor, are
purely self-imposed, since the Federal courts accord entire
freedom in this matter.
189219 U. S. 250 (1911).
140 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268 (1935).
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REMEDIES OF THE PROPERTY OWNER

The problem now presented is as to the procedural rights
which a property owner has to protect himself against illegal
taxation. Obviously he has none in the Federal courts except
where his rights under the Federal Constitution are held to
have been invaded; pure questions of state law are not for
the Federal courts, at least if the state courts have passed
upon them. 141 But if his constitutional rights are invaded, it
becomes important to decide what remedies will be accorded
in the Federal courts.
In general, there are two possible remedies for such a taxpayer. He may either (1) sue to enjoin the collection of the
alleged illegal tax, or (2) he may pay the tax and sue to
recover it, or such part as he claims to be illegal. Logically,
it would seem proper to consider the possibility of an injunction suit first; but, since it is dependent partly upon the availability of the suit to recover taxes, it is considered desirable
to take up first the suit to recover taxes illegally collected.
The Court is entirely clear that a tax violating the Federal
Constitution which is collected by duress may be recovered;
and a failure of a state to provide for such an action will be
unconstitutional and require the Federal courts to allow such
142
a recovery.
The question remains as to what constitutes duress. This
is an important matter, as the Court has thus far been unwilling to require the states to refund taxes collected without
such duress. It is submitted that this is a position which is
of more than doubtful morality; nevertheless, a sufficiently
liberal definition of duress would remove this objection.
The Court was originally extremely technical in its definition of duress, and so denied recovery in rather meritorious
cases. 143 More recently it has taken the more reasonable
view that, where the taxpayer is in fact under substantial
141 See Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288 (1921), where
the Court passed on a question of state law, but only because the state court
had not done so.
142 Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363 (1930).
143 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Dodge County, 98 U. S. 541 (1879).
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compulsion to pay, the payment cannot properly be regarded
as any more voluntary in law than it is in fact-that is to
say not voluntary at all. Probably the leading case is Atchison Ry. Co. v. O'Connor,144 where the Court held that a
payment of a state tax to avoid substantial penalties for nonpayment imposed by the state statute was not voluntary and
could be recovered to the extent illegal. The Court, speaking
by Mr. Justice Holmes, said:
"It is reasonable that a man who denies the legality of a tax should
have a clear and certain remedy. The rule being established that, apart
from special circumstances, he cannot interfere by injunction with the
state's collection of its revenues, an action at law to recover back what
he has paid is the alternative left. Of course, we are speaking of those
cases where the state is not put to an action if the citizen refuses to
pay. In these latter he can interpose his objections by way of defense;
but when, as is common, the state has a more summary remedy, such
as distress, and the party indicates by protest that he is yielding to
what he cannot prevent, courts sometimes, perhaps, have been a little too
slow to recognize the implied duress under which payment is made.
But even if the state is driven to an action, if, at the same time, the
citizen is put at a serious disadvantage in the assertion of his legal, in
this case of his constitutional rights, by defense in the suit, justice may
require that he should be at liberty to avoid those disadvantages by paying promptly and bringing suit on his side.
He is entitled to assert his
1 45
supposed right on reasonably equal terms."
The doctrine of this case has been followed and extended
more recently, 146 so that the situation as to this may be regarded as reasonably satisfactory.
144 223 U. S. 280 (1912).
145 223 U. S. 285-286. At the same time, however, the rather unfair decision
of Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U. S. 468 (1912) was made. Here, the
plaintiff paid a Texas tax under protest and to avoid penalties, especially denial
of the right to do business in the state. The plaintiff contended-and successfully-that it was engaged solely in interstate commerce, and was therefore
not subject to the tax. The Court held, however, that there was actually no
duress, since the plaintiff could not be ejected from the state, when it in fact
did no intra-state business. The tax paid was therefore held not to be

recoverable.
146 Ward v. Love County, 253 U. S.17 (1920), criticizing Union Pac. R. Co.
v. Dodge County, 98 U. S.541 (1879), supra, note 143.
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The states may, however, put reasonable limitations upon
the right to maintain such suits to recover taxes illegally collected. There is even one decision of the Supreme Court that
the state may restrict such suits to its own courts, and not
permit suits in the Federal courts, even though the tax is alleged to violate the Federal Constitution. 147 But while this
was not strictly a dictum, it was a rather minor point in the
case, and might not be followed where the problem was more
definitely raised. The case just referred to 148 is a square
authority that the period of limitation for such suits may be
made very short-in this instance six months after the payment of the tax. On the other hand, if the period is so short
as not to give the taxpayer a reasonable opportunity to commence the suit, it will undoubtedly be regarded as unconstitutional.' 49
Finally, it seems rather clear that the state may change
at its discretion the remedies which it accords for the recovery of illegal taxes, even though the change is made after the
payment of the tax, so long as the taxpayer is given a reasonable opportunity to avail himself of the new remedy. It
is clear that a taxpayer has no vested right in mere remedies
for the recovery of taxes.' 50
We now pass to the remedy for the taxpayer which is much
more attractive, but which he is much less likely to obtain,
at least in the Federal courts-namely, a suit to enjoin the
collection of the tax. The Federal statute prohibiting such
an injunction' 51 is applicable, of course, only to Federal taxes;
but its general viewpoint is followed, and even intensified, by
the Federal Supreme Court in relation to state taxes. 1 52 The
4 7

Burrill v. Locomobile Co., 258 U. S. 34 (1922).
148 Note 147.
149 Security Nat. Bank v. Young, 55 F. (2d) 616 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932),
cert. den. 286 U. S. 551 (1932), holding that a limitation of suits to recover taxes
of only 30 days after payment, is unreasonable and void.
150 Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 (1877).
151 R. S. 3224, 26 U. S. C. 1543.
152 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876). The Court adds, however, that this rule does not perhaps apply quite so rigidly to local as it does
to state-wide taxes.
3.
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Court is quite unwilling to permit such an injunction to be obtained in the Federal courts against the collection of state
taxes, except in an extraordinary case. 153 It constantly emphasizes that very much freedom in the Federal courts in enjoining the collection of state taxes would not only be embarrassing but often well nigh ruinous to the whole fiscal system of
the states.
It is obvious that no injunction will be given if the state
tax can be collected only by court proceedings, 15 4 or ordinarily
if the taxpayer can get an injunction in the state court.1 55
There is one fairly old decision of the Supreme Court reaching the curious result that an alleged discrimination between
state taxing authorities in assessing real property can be attacked only in equity and not in law.'-5 This is entirely contrary to the usual view of the Court, and it is probable that
the suit. at law was dismissed because of the failure of the
taxpayer to prove the discrimination.

57

As already said, the possibility of securing equitable relief
against the collection of property taxes in the state courts is
generally sufficient to show that there is no necessity of such
relief in the Federal courts. The Court has indeed recently
held that even a state statute permitting a suit in equity to
enjoin the collection of taxes illegally imposed is wholly inapplicable in the Federal courts, which will decline the equitable relief given by the state laws in the absence of a showing
of sufficient independent grounds for it in the Federal
courts.'58 A mere showing that an injunction suit would be
more convenient for the taxing authorities as well as for the
taxpayer will not permit it to be brought in the Federal
153 Orient Ins. Co. v. Board, 221 U. S. 358 (1911); Keokuk & Hamilton
Bridge Co. v. Saim, 258 U. S. 122 (1922).
154 Orient Ins. Co. v. Board, 221 U. S. 358 (1911).
155 McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37 (1877); Gallup v. Schmidt, 183
U. S. 300 (1902).
156 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri, 190 U. S. 412 (1903).
157 See 14 Minn. L. R. 188 (1930),
This rule
158 Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121 (1930).
is codified by the amendment to the Judicial Code (U. S. C. sec. 28, par. 41
(1)), enacted Aug. 21, 1937.
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courts.' 59 The Supreme Court thus insists that equitable relief
against the collection of state taxes cannot be given in the
Federal courts without a sufficient showing of an independent
basis for doing so; and this, notwithstanding the fact that the
state freely permits such relief in its own courts, so that the
alleged interference with the state revenue laws does not
seem of itself so important. On the other hand, the mere possibility of sustaining an equitable suit in the state courts will
not necessarily prevent such a suit from being brought in the
Federal courts if the Federal court has jurisdiction on some
independent ground (as by diversity of citizenship) and the
circumstances are such as to justify the equitable suit on general principles.' 60
In spite of this general unwillingness to give equitable relief against state taxation, the Supreme Court will permit a
suit to be brought in the Federal courts to enjoin the collection of state property and other taxes, where the circumstances give independent equity jurisdiction, and furthermore
are more than ordinarily extreme. Probably the leading case
is Raymond v. Chicago Union Transit Co.1 1 Here an injunction was given against the collection of excessive state taxes
assessed against certain large utilities. The Court pointed
out that the collection of the tax would render these utilities
insolvent and would make it practically impossible for them
to continue their public service. Thus the injunction was
deemed to be in the public interest. More conventional bases
for equitable jurisdiction were found in the fact that there
was no provision under the state law for recovery of such
part of these taxes as was paid to the state,'1 62 and that while
the amounts paid to political subdivisions of the state could
probably have been recovered, this would have involved a multiplicity of suits, with very heavy expenses. 63
159 Arkansas B. & L. Ass'n v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269 (1899); Singer S. M.
Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481 (1913). In the latter case, the Court declined
to interfere even though the assessment was made without notice.
160 Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U. S. 288 (1921).
161207 U. S. 20 (1907).
162 See also, Union Pacific R. Co. v. Weld County, 247 U. S. 282 (1918);
Hopkins v. So. California Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 393 (1928).
.63 See also, Coulter v. Louisville R. Co., 196 U. S. 599 (1905); Green
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A few other circumstances have been regarded as sufficient, or at least as contributing, to justify equitable relief
against state taxes in the Federal courts. Thus, a refusal of
the state to pay interest on amounts recovered against it for
taxes illegally collected has been deemed to make the legal
remedy inadequate, so that equitable relief should be given. 164
Likewise, a provision for tax sales upon refusal to pay taxes
upon the property sold is regarded as at least some basis for
equitable jurisdiction, since such deeds will cloud the taxpayer's title to such property;165 though the Court seems to

feel that this of itself is insufficient grounds for equitable relief, since the taxes can be paid and recovered if illegal, and
1 66
the cloud on title thus avoided.

Where equitable relief is given, two conditions are ordinarily insisted upon; and these conditions are especially applicable with respect to property taxes. The first is that the taxpayer must have exhausted his administrative remedies, and
this whether-or not it is a prerequisite to suit to recover the
taxes. 1 67 The second is that the taxpayer must pay to the tax-

ing authorities the amount which is conceded to be due, or
even which the Court considers is plainly due on the face of
the record. 6"
CONCLUSION

It is rather difficult to draw any definite conclusions from
the Supreme Court decisions which have been discussed.
That there are a great many such decisions with regard to
state and local property taxes is obvious; but that most of
these decisions are in favor of upholding the tax, or at least
refusing to interfere, is equally clear. If this is the case with
respect to reported decisions of the Court, it seems obvious
v. Louisville Ry. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917) ; Union Pacific R. Co. v Weld County,
247 U S. 282 (1918).
164 Hopkins v. So. California Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 393 (1928).
165 Green v. Louisville Ry. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917).
166 Union Pacific R. Co. v. Weld County, 24-7 U. S. 282 (1918).
167 Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm, 258 U. S. 122 (1922).
168 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575 (1876); Raymond v. Chicago
Union Transit Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907).
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that it is very much more true with respect to the attempts
which must have been made to bring up such questions. The
number of failures by taxpayers to induce the Court to even
consider the particular problem raised-as by unsuccessful
petitions for certiorari-must have been very large, and must
very emphatically tip the scales in favor of the state property tax laws and their administrators.
Under these circumstances the question can reasonably be
raised whether the Court should not flatly refuse to consider
any problems of state property taxes. 169 Nevertheless, it
seems that the Court is justified in doing so. It is true, of
course, that state judges are under the same duty as Federal
judges to enforce the Federal Constitution; but history teaches
us that they cannot be fully depended upon to do so, even as
respects their own citizens. The possibility of review and
reversal by the Federal Supreme Court is a safeguard of the
constitutional rights of taxpayers much more weighty and important than would appear from the comparatively few cases
where the Court has actually interferred with state decisions.
Furthermore, it can hardly be contended that the Supreme
Court has been unduly oppressive to the taxing power of the
states. There are a very few decisions where the Court has
perhaps unjustifiably interferred;170 but there are probably a
far greater number where the Court probably should have
interferred but felt unable to do so.171 As already pointed out,
most of the difficulties which the states and municipalities are
having in effectively imposing and collecting property taxes
are due to deficiencies in their own statutes, and narrow decisions of their own courts. The Federal Supreme Court has
in general not unduly interferred with state property taxes,
and yet it has, to some extent at least, protected property
owners from unreasonable, and particularly from discriminatory impositions. It seems, therefore, that it should continue
to review such matters, but only in clearly necessitous cases.
169 See T. R. Powell, ob. cit., note 6.
170 E:g. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U. S. 135 (1936), supra,
note 58.
171 E.g. Pittsburgh Ry. Co v.. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894), supra, note 24.

